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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to present a response to two current Department of 
Defense (DoD) initiatives. The first is the DoD National Defense Strategy of 2018, which 
encourages the adoption of new practices to improve system performance and affordability 
to meet current and future threats. The second initiative is the DoD Digital Engineering 
Strategy, which outlines five strategic goals in support of the first initiative. The first strategic 
goal—“Formalize the development, integration, and use of models to inform enterprise and 
program decision making”—is the specific subject of this paper. The response is a 
conceptual methodology that addresses an analytic deficiency identified by a 2017 
congressional commission that examined the capabilities of the DoD civilian staff in their 
determination of force and weapons systems requirements. Specifically, this paper presents 
a framework for a “Defense Systems Effectiveness Modeling and Analysis Capability” whose 
metric is the probability of mission success. The objective is the application of modeling and 
analysis to guide decisions leading to fielding systems having optimum effectiveness 
constrained by affordability and reduced development time. While the current U.S. focus is 
on systems readiness, it is an integral element of the more robust systems effectiveness. 
Introduction 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS; DoD, 2018) makes readiness and 
warfighter needs a priority, with lethality and warfighting the primary objective. The strategy 
emphasizes affordability with sustained and predictable investment to achieve greater 
performance through modernizing the military and restoring readiness. Within this context, 
improvement of readiness involves developing the right systems or systems of systems with 
alacrity.  
To support the goals of the NDS, the DoD’s Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering has initiated the Digital Engineering Strategy (DES), which has 
five goals intended to drive the acquisition of future systems (Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering, 2018). The five goals promote a model-
based, systems engineering (MBSE) wherein systems are digitally rendered. The resulting 
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digital artifacts become the means of communications between stakeholders. The goals are 
as follows: 
1. Formalize the development, integration, and use of models to inform 
enterprise and program decision making; 
2. Provide an enduring, authoritative source of truth; 
3. Incorporate technological innovation to improve the engineering practice; 
4. Establish a supporting infrastructure and environments to perform activities, 
collaborate, and communicate across stakeholders; and 
5. Transform the culture and workforce to adopt and support digital engineering 
across the lifecycle. 
Purpose 
An approach to the first goal of the DES is the purpose of this paper. A crucial 
element of the formalization process is the development of an effectiveness modeling and 
analysis framework. The advent of DES is important because recent criticism by a bipartisan 
congressional commission noted that civilian analytical capabilities for force and weapons 
development within the DoD have severely degraded since their original establishment in 
the 1960s by Robert McNamara (Gordon & Lubold, 2018). The truth of this statement is 
borne out by the lack of an established methodology within the DoD for acquiring systems of 
systems. There is current work underway addressing systems of systems, mission 
engineering, and capability portfolio analysis but not at the level of the Weapon System 
Effectiveness Industry Advisory Committee (WSEIAC) study to be discussed shortly. 
Specific Contribution of This Paper 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it provides clarity of purpose for 
readiness, an oft used and abused term. Why not readiness? A focus on readiness may 
lead to sub-optimum system solution because it ignores three other factors important to 
systems effectiveness and mission success. Mission success is the applicable measure 
because it drives force projection and war-fighting capability. Second, the paper presents a 
framework that addresses the role of readiness within the context of mission success. This 
framework applies to both systems and systems of systems acquisition, providing the 
stakeholders with quantified results.1  
Organization of Paper 
The paper provides a brief discussion of relevant past work that is foundational to the 
development of the Defense Systems Effectiveness Modeling and Analysis Capability 
(DSEMAC). Key terms are defined mathematically, followed by a brief discussion of the 
requirements for a framework that provides the needed structure for the DSEMAC, which in 
turn is followed by a description of the proposed framework. A summary and a description of 
future work conclude the paper. 
Past Work 
A focus on readiness ignores the larger context of systems effectiveness and the 
additional attributes of mission reliability, mission survivability, and mission capability. It is 
                                            
 
 
1 System will be used throughout this paper. 
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the premise of this paper that system effectiveness and mission success are the same and 
the overarching goal. Readiness is a subset of the larger picture that includes mission 
reliability, mission survivability, and mission capability as shown in Figure 1. This view is not 
a new concept. The relationships have a long history that started in the 1950s and was 
extensively documented in a report published by the Weapon System Effectiveness Industry 
Advisory Committee (WSEIAC) in the 1960s (WSEIAC, 1965). Figure 1 is based on the 
WSEIAC report and illustrates the relationship between overall mission effectiveness and its 
constituent components of mission readiness, mission reliability, and mission capability. 
Note that mission survivability is not included in the report and thus omitted from Figure 1. 










Figure 1. The WSEIAC Systems Effectiveness Hierarchy 
(WSEIAC, 1965) 
As defined by the WSEIAC report, mission readiness (often known as operation 
availability [Ao] or operational readiness [OR]) quantifies the percentage of time that the 
system is ready at the start of the mission. Mission reliability (or dependability) quantifies the 
likelihood that the system will perform its mission essential functions throughout the mission. 
Both these terms are well represented in the literature. Mission capability quantifies the 
adequacy of the system to meet the mission goals. Capability is about ways and means. It 
matters not if the system is available and reliable throughout the mission if it cannot achieve 
the desired results because the said ways and means were insufficient or incorrect.  
Figure 2 presents a complete view of the relationships with the addition of mission 
survivability. The probability of mission success is a function of the four terms. Therefore, 
the graphic is a top-level objective hierarchy. As an objective tree, the goal is to maximize 
the probability of mission success. The lower-level objectives each describe a specific 
aspect of mission success and are, therefore, inherently important. The lower-level 
objectives can be expanded by including another level of detail. For example, mission 
survivability can be expanded to susceptibility and vulnerability. In this case, the goal is to 














Figure 2. The Revised WSEIAC Systems Effectiveness Hierarchy 
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The systems effectiveness hierarchy and the following equation for PMS provides a 
quantitative basis for the acquisition of weapons systems and systems of systems. The 




PMS ≡ the probability of mission success for a specified mission 
PAo ≡ the probability that the system is available at the start of the mission 
PRM ≡ the probability that the system will successfully perform specified 
mission essential functions by mission phase 
PSM ≡ the probability that the system will survive the mission 
PCM ≡ the probability that the system meets the capability objectives 
Note the probabilistic formulation of mission success. There are several valid 
reasons for this approach. First, military operations are characterized by random variables, 
for example, probability of detection or probability of kill. Second, probabilities are 
dimensionless, making them easier to work with across diverse system elements such as 
sensors and weapons.  




















Figure 3. Systems Effectiveness Relationships 
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In systems terminology, Figure 3 is a context diagram that becomes a starting point 
for the framework requirements discussed in the following section. 
Framework Requirements 
A framework is a structured way of relating objects of interest and their resulting 
interactions. The importance of a framework in the acquisition of systems cannot be 
understated. First, a framework organizes theory and practice and provides a structure for 
methods. Second, complex systems and systems of systems are typically not developed as 
a single architecture. Thus, there are time-phasing and contractual issues. Individual 
systems are usually single function, and system couplings are interdependent (Luman, 
2000). 
Third, there currently is no systematic method of measuring systems effectiveness. 
The literature is devoid of theory and standards. Most approaches center on qualitative 
methods, which are subjective at best.  
Basic Requirements 
There are four major requirements for the framework: The supporting methods must 
be quantitative, the supporting methods must present results probabilistically, the supporting 
methods must be reliability based, and, finally, the framework must support hierarchy and 
abstraction. The end goal is a framework that supports evaluation of mission success versus 
cost, where the emphasis is on the likelihood of mission success. 
Quantitative 
One of the first steps in an analysis is to describe the processes involved. 
Mathematics is precise and explanatory, facilitating analysis and explanation of more 
complex problems than possible using qualitative methods. The model for the probability of 
mission success must be based on proven methodology. The challenge is developing and 
maintaining a model for each mission which will be large and complex for complex systems. 
Probabilistic 
Military operations are about achieving success and the estimation of event 
probabilities, typically described as measures of effectiveness (MOE) or measures of 
performance (MOP). Often parametric values are used incorrectly as measures. For 
example, detection of a threat is expressed as a probability of detection and is a function of 
several parameters including range. The outcome is the probability of detection as a 
function of range. 
Reliability-Based 
Reliability theory is based on the premise of system success and failure (Psuccess = 1 
– Pfailure). Many of its concepts are foundational precepts to quantifying system effectiveness. 
Further, most of the system variables of interest are reliability related. Figure 3 identifies 
them as key system attributes. 
Hierarchy and Abstraction 
Systems are hierarchical by nature with increasing detail at each level of expansion. 
The framework must support models that describe each level of expansion. This paper 
suggests a black box approach at each layer.  
A Notional Effectiveness Model 
Systems concepts are based on a need to meet an operational requirement. The 
effectiveness of how well this need is met (mission success) is a measure of its tactical utility 
and its value to the force structure. Figure 4 is a notional model adapted from Figure 2-1 
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found in the Reliability Engineering Handbook (Bureau of Naval Weapons, 1964). It 
summarizes the first three figures and is intended to convey several points: how well the 




















Figure 4. A Systems Effectiveness Model 
(Adapted from Bureau of Naval Weapons, 1964) 
This model, when combined with a decision process, becomes the basis for the 
overall framework model. 
Proposed Framework 
Figure 5 is a generic decision process. It serves as a guide to understanding how to 



















Figure 5. Generic Decision Process 
Problem Formulation 
With the framework in place, it is appropriate to return to the purpose of the 
framework to wit: to make decisions about system selection. There are three basic steps to 
the decision process. First, understand the set of system variables and how they interact 
quantitatively and accurately. Knowledge of the system is imperative. In the framework, this 
is represented by the upper five boxes (orange and purple). Second, select a single MOE 
expressible in terms of the variables represented by the blue boxes. A premise of this paper 
is that mission success is that MOE. The final step is to select the method by which the best 
system is selected represented by the green boxes. 
The decisions involve making choices from a set of candidate solutions in order to 
find the most desirable solution. Once the decision is made, it becomes an irrevocable 
allocation of resources. Given the set of candidate solutions, the task becomes one of 
defining a system such that: 
Maximize PMS = (PAo)(PRM)(PSM)(PCM), 
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subject to the following constraints: 
 Specified mission 
 Required performance 
 Budget 
This is a basic optimization problem. It is decisive because the result is one 
system—the best one. 
 
Figure 6. A Framework for a Defense Systems Effectiveness Modeling and 
Analysis Capability 
Comments on Cost-Effectiveness 
In the model described above, cost-effectiveness has been chosen as the criterion 
for the model because it is best used for ranking alternatives that are relatively similar 
especially when there is a single dominant objective whose attainment can be assessed 
directly or for which a good proxy value exists (Quade, 1982). It is axiomatic in the world of 
quantitative analysis that, in general, the possibility of selecting between two alternatives 
based on cost and effectiveness data alone is not possible. It is a choice between specifying 
performance or cost. If the former, then cost is minimized; if the latter, then effectiveness is 
maximized. 
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Summary 
This paper presents the rationale for a framework for a Defense Systems 
Effectiveness Modeling and Analysis Capability. It describes why the key decision criterion is 
the probability of mission success and shows the approach to the derivation of the 
framework. This framework is inclusive of capability, readiness, mission reliability, and 
survivability (which is typically omitted in system effectiveness evaluations). 
Future Research 
As noted, survivability is not usually included. While availability and readiness have a 
large literature base, there is very little material on survivability. 
A second research topic is Candidate Capability Architecture solution development. 
There is no literature on performance-based architecture development. 
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